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Family Law.  Saltzman v. Saltzman, 218 A.3d 551 (R.I. 2019).  A 
Rhode Island Family Court Justice does not abuse their discretion 
when denying a parent’s request to relocate with their children 
during divorce proceedings when the justice thoroughly considers 
relevant factors.  The trial justice has ample discretion to review 
the record and determine alimony amounts, child support, 
attorneys’ fees and costs, the distribution of the marital estate, 
visitation schedules, and sanctions against either party, when 
necessary.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In September of 2009, the plaintiff, Adam Saltzman, and the 
defendant, Erin Saltzman, married and later had two children 
together.1 The couple first lived in New York City where Adam was 
a physician and Erin was a buyer for Macy’s department store.2  In 
May 2011, Adam began a fellowship at Massachusetts General 
Hospital, and the pair relocated to Cambridge, Massachusetts.3  
The two again relocated to Barrington, Rhode Island, in 2013 after 
Adam began working as a cardiologist, earning $550,000 per year.4  
Meanwhile, Erin did not work and was the primary caregiver for 
their two children.5  
The relationship began to experience tension—in part due to 
Erin’s frequent trips to visit her family in Ohio.6  Eventually, Adam 
began an extramarital affair during one of Erin’s trips.7   
1. Saltzman v. Saltzlman, 218 A.3d 551, 554 (R.I. 2019).  For clarity, the




4. Id. at 554–55.
5. Id. at 555.
6. Id.
7. Id.  According to the trial justice’s decision, Adam was “less than can-
did with his responses in . . . testimony . . . as to his sexual involvement with 
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Almost six years later, in July of 2015, Adam filed for divorce, 
citing irreconcilable differences.8  The case began in Providence 
County Family Court.9  After proceedings, the trial justice granted 
divorce based on irreconcilable differences.10  Ultimately, the trial 
justice found that Adam’s infidelity led to the relationship’s demise, 
though each party had contributed to the breakdown of the 
marriage.11 
Adam and Erin were granted joint custody of the minor 
children, but the children would primarily reside with Erin.12  
Adam was granted reasonable visitation rights with his children, 
which included alternate weekends and overnight visitations on 
Mondays and Wednesdays.13  Erin had requested to relocate to 
Ohio with the children, but the trial justice denied the request.14  
At the justice’s order, Adam was to comply with the following: (1) 
pay the costs of their shared family home for thirty months before 
it sold; (2) pay $50,000 of alimony; and (3) pay $5,500 per month in 
child support.15  After the sale of the shared family home, Erin 
would receive seventy percent of the net proceeds, and Adam would 
receive the remaining thirty percent.16  The marital estate balance 
would be divided evenly between Adam and Erin.17  Finally, both 
parties were ordered to pay their own attorneys’ fees.18   
Erin appealed the trial justice’s decision to the Supreme 
Court.19  On appeal, Erin raised a number of arguments and 
claimed that the trial justice erred when: (1) he denied her request 
to relocate to Ohio; (2) he ordered temporary use of the home to her 
for thirty months before it was sold; (3) he calculated an insufficient 
amount of child support; (4) he ordered each party pay their own 
another woman, which he later modified prior to trial.”  Id.  Consequently, the 
trial justice sanctioned Adam for his lack of candor. Id.  
8. Id. at 554.
9. See id.
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attorneys’ fees and costs; (4) he ordered an equal split of marital 
property; (5) he granted an improper visitation schedule; and (6) he 
imposed an insufficient amount of sanctions on Adam.20  The 
Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and affirmed the trial justice’s 
decision in part and remanded in part for an entry of final 
judgment.21 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Supreme Court reviewed the trial justice’s orders and 
addressed Erin’s claims of error in turn.   
A. Relocation
To determine the outcome in relocation cases, the Court uses
the best interest of the child standard, a determination that is in 
the sound discretion of the trial justice.22  The Court uses an eight-
factor analysis when determining this standard, found in Dupré v. 
Dupré.23  The Dupré factors include:  
(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and
duration of the child’s relationship with the parent propos-
ing to relocate and with the non-relocating parent.
. . . . 
(2) The reasonable likelihood that the relocation will
enhance the general quality of life for both the child and
the parent seeking the relocation, including, but not
limited to, economic and emotional benefits, and educa-
tional opportunities.
(3) The probable impact that the relocation will have on the
child’s physical, educational, and emotional development.
Any special needs of the child should also be taken into
account in considering this factor.
(4) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between
the non-relocating parent and child through suitable
20. Id.
21. Id. at 554.
22. Id. at 556 (quoting Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 186 A.3d 1074, 1081 (R.I.
2018); Dupré v. Dupré, 857 A.2d 242, 256 (R.I. 2004)). 
23. Id. (citing Dupré, 857 A.2d at 256).
2021] SURVEY SECTION 929 
visitation arrangements, considering the logistics and 
financial circumstances of the parties. 
. . . . 
(5) The existence of extended family or other support
systems available to the child in both locations.
(6) Each parent’s reasons for seeking or opposing the
relocation.
. . . . 
(7) In cases of international relocation, the question of
whether the country to which the child is to be relocated is
a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction will be an important
consideration.
(8) To the extent that they may be relevant to a relocation
inquiry, the Pettinato factors also will be significant.24
No single one of these factors is dispositive to determining the 
child’s best interest.25  Ultimately, the trial justice’s findings of fact 
will not be reversed unless it is determined upon review that the 
trial justice abused his discretion.26  
Further, “[t]he trial justice must also consider the eight factors 
found in Pettinato v. Pettinato.”27  The Pettinato factors include:  
(1) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents regarding
the child’s custody.
(2) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court
deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understand-
ing, and experience to express a preference.
(3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with
the child’s parent or parents, the child’s siblings, and any
other person who may significantly affect the child’s best
interest.
24. Id. at 556–57 (quoting Dupré, 857 A.2d at 257–59).
25. Id. at 557 (quoting Ainsworth, 186 A.3d at 1082).
26. Id. at 556 (quoting Dupré, 857 A.2d at 256).
27. Id. (citing Ainsworth, 186 A.3d at 1082).
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(4) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and
community.
(5) The mental and physical health of all individuals
involved.
(6) The stability of the child’s home environment.
(7) The moral fitness of the child’s parents.
(8) The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate a
close and continuous parent-child relationship between the
child and the other parent.28
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice had 
diligently reviewed and considered both the Dupré and Pettinato 
factors.29  The trial justice did not find that Erin’s Ohio employment 
opportunities outweighed her employment opportunities in Rhode 
Island.30  Next, the trial justice found that the children were “flour-
ishing” in their environment in Rhode Island, and the justice was 
not convinced that their emotional well-being would be enhanced in 
Ohio.31  Further, the trial justice concluded that both Erin and 
Adam had meaningful relationships with their children and that 
both were determined to maintain those relationships following the 
divorce.32  Erin argued that Adam’s substantial income would make 
visitations to Ohio feasible and, therefore, parental involvement 
would continue.33  Although Adam’s income would allow him to 
afford travel costs, the trial justice found that transportation and 
lodging difficulties, in addition to his employment obligations, 
would make it a challenging dynamic.34  The trial justice also found 
that the children had a “more than sufficient” support system in 
Rhode Island with Adam’s family residing a reasonable distance 
away in Massachusetts, and that while the support in Ohio would 
be “extensive,” remaining in Rhode Island would be a fine 
outcome.35  Because the trial justice thoroughly considered the 






33. Id. at 558.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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Dupré and Pettinato factors, the Court found no fault in his decision 
to deny Erin’s motion to relocate to Ohio with the children.36  
Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial justice’s denial of the motion 
to relocate.37 
B. Alimony and Temporary Use of the Marital Home
On appeal, Erin also argued that the thirty-month span of
alimony award totaling $50,000 was an abuse of the trial justice’s 
discretion given Adam’s significant income and her extended period 
of unemployment.38  According to Rhode Island General Laws 
section 15-5-16, an alimony award is authorized by the trial justice 
to “provide support for a spouse for a reasonable length of time to 
enable the recipient to become financially independent and 
self-sufficient.”39  The trial justice found that Erin was capable of 
holding a job, as she had been employed in the past, and thirty 
months would be sufficient for her to secure new employment.40   
Erin added that the payment method determined by the trial 
justice was an abuse of his discretion.41  In her appeal, she argued 
that it was improper for her to be required to use portions of the 
alimony award to maintain the former marital home, which Erin 
was authorized to use until it sold.42  The Supreme Court disagreed 
and held that a trial justice has flexibility to set alimony 
arrangements per section 15-5-16 and that this arrangement did 
not constitute an abuse of the trial justice’s discretion.43  Thus, the 
Court affirmed the trial justice’s alimony award.44 
C. Child Support
Erin also argued that the trial justice erred in his award of
child support because he did not award the proper minimum child 
support amount.45  However, the Supreme Court found this 
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 559.
39. Id. at 558–59 (quoting 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (1956)).





45. Id. at 559–60.
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argument baseless because the trial justice’s award actually ex-
ceeded the Rhode Island Family Court Administrative Order guide-
lines by thirty-one percent.46  As a result, the Court affirmed the 
trial justice’s child support award.47 
D. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Erin, however, did prevail on one argument.  She claimed that
the trial justice erred when he declined to award attorneys’ fees and 
costs because the trial justice never made findings as to her ability 
to pay her legal fees.48  The Court agreed with Erin and cited the 
fact that there was no evidence in the record that would 
demonstrate Erin’s ability to afford her legal fees.49  The Court 
vacated the trial justice’s decision denying Erin’s request for 
attorneys’ fees and remanded the issue to the Family Court.50 
E. Distribution of the Marital Estate
Erin also argued that the trial justice erred in distributing the
marital estate and apportioning seventy percent of property to Erin 
and thirty percent to Adam.51  However, the trial justice is given 
broad discretion in distributing marital assets, and, unless the 
Supreme Court finds that the trial justice abused his discretion, the 
distribution will not be overturned.52  Adam’s infidelity did not 
outweigh all of the other factors that the trial justice had to assess 
when determining the distribution of property, as Erin had argued, 
although it was part of the consideration.53  Consequently, the 
Court affirmed the trial justice’s decision with respect to the 
equitable distribution of the marital estate.54 
46. Id. at 560.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 560–61.  The standard for determining whether the party seek-
ing attorneys’ fees should be compensated is laid out in McCulloch v. McCul-
loch.  Id. at 560 (citing McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 A.3d 810, 826 (R.I. 2013)).  
50. Id. at 561.
51. Id. The standard for dividing marital property is established in Ton-
dreault v. Tondreault and 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1(a). Id. (citing Ton-
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F. Visitation Schedule
The Supreme Court was also unwilling to disturb the trial
justice’s findings with regards to the visitation schedules, which 
Erin argued was not in the best interest of the children.55  The 
Court held that the trial justice properly considered the Pettinato 
factors when determining the best interest of the child and that the 
consideration for the visitation schedule was in accordance with 
that process.56  Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial justice’s de-
cision in setting the visitation schedule.57 
G. Sanctions
Finally, Erin argued that the trial justice did not sufficiently
sanction Adam for his “lack of candor.”58  The Supreme Court 
disagreed and found that the $3,000 sanction was determined after 
a proper review of the evidence and was an appropriate amount for 
a false statement under oath under these circumstances.59  Thus, 
the Court affirmed the trial justice’s decision regarding the sanction 
imposed.60 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court repeatedly stated that the 
trial justice was in the best position to make determinations during 
divorce proceedings and that the majority of the issues on appeal 
would be decided on an abuse of discretion standard.  The Court 
“accord[s] great deference to the sound discretion of the trial justice 
in assessing and weighing [the Pettinato and Dupré] factors because 
‘it is the trial justice who is in the best position to determine what 
factors may be relevant on a case-by-case basis.’”61  On appeal, the 
Supreme Court only vacated one of seven determinations made by 
the trial justice.62  The Court expressed trust in the trial justice to 
consider arguments from each party, review the evidence 
55. Id.





61. Id. at 558.
62. See id. at 560.
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thoroughly, and determine the best outcome using judicial 
standards from existing case law. 
The Court made clear its confidence in the trial justice’s review 
while also making clear its willingness to overturn any outcome if 
there was any evidence the trial justice abused his discretion. 
While the Court recognizes the trial court’s primary role in family 
law cases, reviewing a trial justice’s procedures and methods is a 
critical function of the appellate process.  The Supreme Court found 
it necessary to vacate the trial justice’s denial of Erin’s request for 
attorneys’ fees to ensure fairness.63 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a Family Court 
justice did not abuse his discretion when he denied a parent’s 
request to relocate with the couple’s children, set the alimony and 
child support amounts, distributed the marital estate, set the 
visitation schedule, and imposed sanctions on the other parent for 
lack of candor.  However, the Court did vacate and remand the trial 
justice’s decision to deny the parent’s request for attorneys’ fees and 
costs because there was no evidence that she could pay those fees. 
 Carla Aveledo 
63. Id. at  561.
